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Abstract We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction
level of player’s powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and
concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of ‘concurrent
game logic’ CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how
this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers
and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.
Keywords Simultaneous games · Parallelism · Game logic · Evaluation games ·
IF logic · Branching quantifiers
1 Introduction: parallelism in games
Games are very much a part of our daily lives. Even our dialogues, arguments, or other
interactions can be viewed naturally as games involving goals and strategies. Games
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also play an important role in economics, logic, linguistics and computer science. In
all these settings, the following distinction makes sense. We can talk about a single
game, but also about several games played in sequence, or in parallel. While sequen-
tial games have been studied a lot recently by logicians, the focus of this paper is
simultaneous play in parallel games.
In game theory, typical matrix games like ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ involve simulta-
neous moves for two players: each chooses independently from the other, and the
outcome may be viewed as the set of both moves. In another setting, computer scien-
tists use parallel games with simultaneous moves to model concurrent processes. And







These have been modelled by means of ‘IF games’ of imperfect information by
Hintikka and Sandu (1997). E.g., with the preceding quantifier pattern, the challenge
player Abelard chooses an assignment for x following which the response player
Eloise chooses one for y in one game. In another part of the game without informa-
tional access to the first, Abelard chooses for z following which Eloise chooses for u.
We may view these games as played simultaneously, and after this phase, we have a
‘test’ game checking whether Rxyzu holds.
How can we model these games in logic? The structure of sequential games, and
players’ responses to observed moves by others is relatively well-understood in terms
of modal logic. Parikh (1985) used analogies with Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL)
to define a Dynamic Game Logic (DGL) of sequential game constructions, represent-
ing players’ global powers for determining the final outcomes of the game. Moreover,
van Benthem (2001) showed how dynamic logics enhanced with epistemic and pref-
erence modalities can describe a richer move-by-move local structure of extensive
sequential games, and in particular the interplay between players’s moves and their
uncertainties. But what about parallel games? So far, no version of DGL has been
proposed which deals with parallel games. Likewise, no elegant game logic is known
for the above IF evaluation games.
Finding such a logic is not one question, but a whole family, depending on how
we cast parallel play. In computer science, the challenge of concurrency has led to
such systems as Process Algebra and Game Semantics. These systems vary in what
communication they allow between the different components of a parallel process.
Baeten and Verhoef (1995) gives a nice exposition of different types of parallel oper-
ators, viz. free merge, left merge as well as communication merge. Modelling ‘open
systems’ that interact with their environment gave rise to the concept of ‘concurrent
game structures’ Alur et al. (2002), both synchronous and asynchronous (interleaving).
Against this background, the present paper has a modest aim. We will model simul-
taneous play of parallel games in terms of players’ abstract powers, without allowing
for communication. Using ideas from dynamic logic for concurrency, we will propose
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a system where players’ powers in a parallel game can be reduced to their powers in
the constituent games. This is by no means the only perspective that makes sense, and
we will discuss some alternatives in our Sect. 4 on game bisimulation, game algebra,
and richer modal languages.
Our starting point is this. Goldblatt (1992) proves completeness for concurrent PDL
over abstract state models, proposed by Peleg (1987), whose key program construct
is α ∩ β, meaning “α and β are executed in parallel”. We will work at this same
modal abstraction level for describing players’ powers in games, for its familiarity
and elegance. And thus, we seek the missing link in the following diagram:
PDL(sequential programs) DGL(sequential game logic)
CPDL(concurrent extension)  CDGL?(concurrent game logic)
After explaining the less familiar parts of this diagram, we propose a new con-
current dynamic game logic (CDGL), prove some of its key properties, including
completeness—and relate all this to logical evaluation games and game algebra. We
finally show how CDGL suggests further interesting questions, as well as generaliza-
tions to richer modal logics of parallel games.
Before doing all this, here are two more points. One is that we say ‘games’ where
a game theorist would say ‘game forms’, since we disregard preferences or utilities.
The latter structure is important, but beyond the scope of this paper. This is in line with
common usage in logic and computer science, though it may sound strange at first to
readers from other communities. The other, more crucial point is this. Parikh’s DGL is
a logic of determined games, where one of the two players has a winning strategy. But
as we shall see, this mathematically convenient simplification no longer works with
parallel games, so we will allow non-determined games throughout, whose sequential
logic will be denoted by DGL• in later sections.
2 From PDL to DGL
2.1 Powers of players in complex games
Propositional dynamic logic is well-known and we assume that the reader is familiar
with it (Harel et al. 2000; Blackburn et al. 2001). Its ideas have spread to many other
areas, including the dynamic logic of sequential games. We start with an informal
analysis of the players’ powers in extensive games. Following that, we briefly review
the basics of DGL, first proposed in Parikh (1985), and further developed by Pauly
(2001), Pauly and Parikh (2003), van Benthem (2003) and several others. DGL works
over ‘game boards’ rather than real games, but to motivate this abstraction, we will
first analyze the latter.
Consider forcing relations describing each player’s powers to end a game in a set
of final states, starting from an initial state:
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sρiG X : player i has a strategy for playing game G from state s onwards, whose
final states are always in the set X , whatever the other players choose to do.
As an example, consider the following simple extensive game tree describing a

















1 2 3 4
In this game, player E has two strategies, forcing the following sets of end states
{1, 2}, and {3, 4}, while player A has four strategies, forcing one of the sets of states
{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, and {2, 4}.
This is a determined game. Non-determinacy arises, for instance, when we allow
imperfect information about other players’ moves. In the following imperfect infor-
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Players’ powers are now given by uniform strategies which prescribe the same move
at epistemically indistinguishable nodes. Thus, E’s powers are the same as above,
whereas A can now just force the game to end in {1, 3} (‘always play left’) and
{2, 4} (‘always play right’).
Similar non-determined phenomena occur in strategic matrix games. In Prisoners’
Dilemma, players simultaneously choose one of {co-operate}, {defect}, and the power
for any choice consists of two outcomes, sharing the chosen move, but differing in
what the other does.
While the examples discussed above are of finite games, ‘forcing relations’ apply
equally well to infinite games as well, viewing their complete histories as the outcomes.
In particular, even sequential games of perfect information can be non-determined with
infinite play. The notions and results in our paper apply to all these settings, illustrating
the power of abstraction.
Forcing relations satisfy two simple conditions van Benthem (2003):
(C1) Monotonicity: If sρiG X and X ⊆ X ′, then sρiG X ′.
(C2) Consistency: If sρEG Y and sρ AG Z , then Y and Z overlap.
Here, Monotonicity makes for smoother theory—though it may obscure some intui-
tive features of players’ powers. In this paper, we will assume Monotonicity for the
most part, for ease of exposition. But at some strategic places in our exposition, we
also give more informative formulations of players’ powers that work without it. For a
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deeper logical study of non-monotonic versions of powers in a general neighbourhood
setting, we refer to Hansen et al. (2007).
For determined games, a much stronger third condition holds, which says that, if
one player lacks a set power X , the other player has the complement power −X . This
property typically failed in our earlier games with imperfect information, and with
simultaneous moves. We will discuss this issue once again later.
Next, consider the following intuitive constructs which form games out of given
ones. We do not provide their precise definitions as mathematical operations on
trees, which are available in many places, but their meaning should be clear: choice
(G ∪ G ′), dual (Gd), and sequential composition (G; G ′). Some game logics also
have a construct of iteration for repeated play, but we will disregard such infinitary
game constructions in this paper—interesting though they are.
The following observation shows how players’ powers have an elegant recursive
structure in complex games (van Benthem 1999). Note that we are not assuming deter-
minacy, which explains our deviation from the more usual presentations of DGL . We
need to describe the powers of both players independently, without the winner taking
all the center stage in the account. We will use ‘E’ and ‘A’ to denote the two players,
and ‘i’ for either player when the statement is the same for both.
Fact 2.1 Forcing relations for players in complex sequential two-person games satisfy
the following equivalences:
sρEG∪G ′ X iff sρEG X or sρEG ′ X
sρ AG∪G ′ X iff ∃Z : sρ AG Z , ∃Z ′ : sρ AG ′ Z ′ and X = Z ∪ Z ′
sρEGd X iff sρ AG X
sρ AGd X iff sρEG X
sρiG;G ′ X iff ∃Z : sρiG Z and for each z ∈ Z , ∃Xz : zρiG ′ Xz,
with X = ⋃{Xz : z ∈ Z}.
Some of these equivalences can be easily simplified using Monotonicity. We gave
this version as it seems closer to computation of powers in concrete games, both
sequential, and later on, also parallel.
2.2 Test games
In what follows, we also need a stipulation of powers for the auxiliary ‘test games’,
which have been a topic of some discussion in the literature. The standard DGL stip-
ulation is given by:
sρEδ? X iff s ∈ [[δ]] and s ∈ X.
sρ Aδ? X iff s ∈ [[δ]] or s ∈ X.
This makes test games determined, but the roles of the two players look asymmetric.
In our view, the following more symmetric stipulation is preferable, which we are
going to adopt for DGL•:
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sρ Aδ? X iff s ∈ [[δ]] and s ∈ X.
This makes test games one more example of indeterminacy: A does not get any
powers if s ∈ [[δ]], but this does not mean that E gets every power. Also, on both
stipulations, players never get the empty set as a power: Non-Triviality holds.
One reason why taking a stand on test games is confusing are the three notions
involved: a test game δ?, its dual game (δ?)d , and the test game (¬δ)?. We will not
attempt to sort all this out here, as it seems orthogonal to the main points that we want
to make in what follows.
2.3 A dynamic logic of game boards
Now we leave the arena of concrete games G, moving towards ‘generic games’ that
can be played starting from any state s on ‘game boards’. In this generic calculus,
atomic games can be arbitrary: finite, infinite, with perfect or imperfect information.
The basic ‘game boards’ are models with a set of states plus some ‘hard-wired’ forcing
relations, defined in the following:
Definition 2.2 A game model M = (S, {ρig | g ∈ }, V ) has a set S of states, a val-
uation V assigning truth values to atomic propositions in states, and for each g ∈ ,
ρig ⊆ S ×P(S). For each g, the relations satisfy Monotonicity and Consistency, and
we also require Non-Triviality: no player can force the empty set.
Note that the forcing relation ρ, unlike the state-to-state transition relations for
programs in PDL, runs from states to sets of states.
The language of DGL• (without game iteration) is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 Given a set of atomic games  and a set of atomic propositions ,
game terms γ and formulas φ are defined inductively:
γ := g | φ? | γ ; γ | γ ∪ γ | γ d
φ := ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | 〈γ, i〉φ,
where p ∈ , g ∈  and i ∈ {A, E}.
The player modalities introduce an explicit notion of agency.
The truth definition for formulas φ in models M at states s is standard, except that
the modality 〈γ, i〉φ is interpreted as follows:
M, s | 〈γ, i〉φ iff there exists X : sρiγ X and ∀x ∈ X : M, x | φ.
In this semantics, we assume the earlier recursive definitions of forcing relations for
complex game terms. One can check by induction that these preserve Monotonicity,
Consistency, and Non-Triviality.
Here is the basic result for this logic. Our proof follows the method of Pauly (2001)
for determined games, using the suggestions in van Benthem (1999) to circumvent the
assumption of determinacy.
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Theorem 2.4 DGL• is complete w.r.t. game models and its validities are axiomatized
by the following axioms:
(a) all propositional tautologies and inference rules
(b) if  φ → ψ then  〈g, i〉φ → 〈g, i〉ψ
(c) 〈g, E〉φ → ¬〈g, A〉¬φ
(d) ¬〈γ, i〉⊥
(e) reduction axioms:
〈α ∪ β, E〉φ ↔ 〈α, E〉φ ∨ 〈β, E〉φ
〈α ∪ β, A〉φ ↔ 〈α, A〉φ ∧ 〈β, A〉φ
〈γ d , E〉φ ↔ 〈γ, A〉φ
〈γ d , A〉φ ↔ 〈γ, E〉φ
〈α;β, i〉φ ↔ 〈α, i〉〈β, i〉φ
〈δ?, E〉φ ↔ (δ ∧ φ)
〈δ?, A〉φ ↔ (¬δ ∧ φ)
Proof Soundness of these axioms should be clear from the definition of forcing rela-
tions for the complex games given earlier. We stated the consistency axiom just for
one player, as the other one follows.
For the completeness, we use a canonical model construction. The model is
C = (Sc, {Qig | g ∈ }, V c), with Sc the set of all maximally consistent sets of
formulae. Let φ̂ = {sc ∈ Sc : φ ∈ sc}. We set:
sc ∈ V c(p) iff p ∈ sc
sc Qig X iff ∃φ̂ ⊆ X : 〈g, i〉φ ∈ sc
For all Y ⊆ Sc, we define Qig(Y ) = {sc : sc QigY }. Next a function Qiγ for complex
formulas is defined recursively as follows:
1. QEα∪β(Y ) = QEα (Y )
⋃ QEβ (Y )
2. Q Aα∪β(Y ) = Q Aα (Y )
⋂ Q Aβ (Y )
3. Q A
αd
(Y ) = QEα (Y )
4. QE
αd
(Y ) = Q Aα (Y )
5. Qi
α;β(Y ) = Qiα(Qiβ(Y ))
6. QEδ?(Y ) = δC
⋂
Y where δC = {sc : C, sc | δ}
7. Q Aδ?(Y ) = ¬δC
⋂
Y where ¬δC = {sc : C, sc | δ}
What we need to prove then is the following lemma:
Lemma 2.5 For any maximally consistent set sc ∈ Sc and any formula φ, the follow-
ing holds: C, sc | φ iff φ ∈ sc.
To do so, we prove the following two claims by simultaneous induction on φ and γ :
(1) φC = φ̂, and (2) ∀ψ : Qiγ (ψ̂) = ̂〈γ, i〉ψ
The base of both claims hold by definition. The boolean inductive steps for (1) are
standard. For the game modality (〈γ, i〉φ), (1) can be proved easily using (2). We now
prove (2) for complex game terms γ . Here are the typical cases:
[217] 123
254 Synthese (2008) 165:247–268
Suppose sc Qi
α;βψ̂ . Then, by definition s
c Qiα Qiβψ̂ . Now by the induction
hypothesis, Qiβ(ψ̂) = ̂〈β, i〉ψ , and so, Qiα(Qiβ(ψ̂)) = Qiα( ̂〈β, i〉ψ). Thus, sc ∈
Qiα( ̂〈β, i〉ψ) = ̂〈α, i〉〈β, i〉ψ , which implies that 〈α, i〉〈β, i〉ψ ∈ sc. Then, by the rel-
evant reduction axiom, 〈α;β, i〉ψ ∈ sc. The argument is analogous for the converse.
Suppose sc Q Aα∪βψ̂ . Then sc ∈ Q Aα (ψ̂)
⋂ Q Aβ (ψ̂) by definition, and hence 〈α, A〉ψ∈ sc and 〈β, A〉ψ ∈ sc by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, 〈α ∪ β, A〉ψ ∈ sc by
the relevant reduction axiom. The argument is analogous for the converse.
Suppose sc Q A
αd
ψ̂ . Then sc QEα ψ̂ by definition, and so we have 〈α, E〉ψ ∈ sc by
the induction hypothesis. Thus, 〈αd , A〉ψ ∈ sc by the relevant reduction axiom. All
further cases are analogous.
The completeness result now follows from the Lemma; with an added routine check
that the forcing relations on our canonical game board satisfy the conditions of Mono-
tonicity, Consistency, and Non-Triviality. unionsq
One way of summarizing this completeness proof is as a combination of two
insights. First, the reduction axioms for players’ powers turn every formula into
an equivalent one involving only modalities for atomic game terms. Next, the latter
really form just a poly-modal logic interpreted over neighborhood semantics—with
just three additional constraints, viz. the monotonicity, the non-triviality, and the
consistency between paired modalities 〈α, A〉 and 〈α, E〉.
It is to be noted that the logic DGL• presented here is also decidable, since the pre-
ceding completeness proof can be carried out wholly in a finite universe of subformulas
for the initial formulas to be refuted. But we will not discuss issues of computational
complexity in this paper.
2.4 Intermezzo: determinacy and non-determinacy
We have proved the completeness of game logic for the non-determined case. To sim-
plify things, game logic as given in Parikh (1985) and Pauly and Parikh (2003) works
with determined games. While convenient, this also suppresses the essentially inter-
twined roles of the players. The condition can be stated as follows, with S denoting
the total set of states:
(C3) Determinacy: If it is not the case that sρEG X , then, sρ AG(S − X), and the
same for A vis-a-vis E .
We summarize once more why non-determinacy is natural: cf. also van Benthem
(1999). Consider our examples in Sect. 2.1. In the imperfect information game given
there, the set {2, 3} is not a power for player E , but neither is its complement {1, 4}
a power for A. Essentially the same held with simultaneous play in matrix games,
and we will elaborate that example in Sect. 3.2, using an appropriate account of com-
pound outcome states. Finally, as we pointed out already, our test games, too, violate
condition (C3) for understandable reasons.
In determined games, the powers of one player completely fix those of the other.
Parikh (1985) showed that the dual-free logic of determined games with iteration is
sound and complete with respect to the class of all board models. Pauly (2001) showed
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that iteration-free logic of determined games with dual is sound and complete on
the class of all game models. Our completeness proof for the non-determined case
includes dual but not iteration. Since the first version of this paper appeared in van
Benthem et al. (2007), van Eijck and Verbrugge (2008) have used our framework to
analyze the full sequential language with iteration, announcing a completeness proof
for DGL• with iteration.
Against this background, our general setting including parallel play suggests the
need for a richer logic which can deal with non-determined games as well as a non-
sequential ‘product’ construct for games. In the next section, we will discuss a modal
process logic which leads the way.
2.5 Game boards and real games
DGL• and DGL are about generic games played on game boards. But as stated in
Sect. 1, there is another, and richer, tradition: process algebra and game semantics
give mathematical models for communication and general interaction between agents
and systems Bergstra et al. (2001) with real game trees for players and their moves.
We only note one simple connection here. One can represent game boards as coming
from real game trees, either determined or not, using the following two representation
results from van Benthem (2001):
Proposition 2.6 Any two families F1 and F2 of subsets of some set S satisfying the
three earlier conditions (C1), (C2), and (C3) are the powers of players at the root of
some two-step extensive game.
Proposition 2.7 Any two families F1 and F2 of subsets of some set S satisfying just
the conditions (C1), (C2) can be realized as players’ powers in a two-step imperfect
information game.
For further discussion, we refer to Sect. 6. As for the present, however, we will stay
at the board level.
3 From concurrent PDL to concurrent DGL
3.1 Concurrent PDL
The system of concurrent dynamic logic due to Peleg (1987) extends regular dynamic
logic by introducing a new program operator α × β, interpreted as “α and β executed
in parallel”. In Goldblatt (1992) two modalities 〈α〉 and [α] are introduced for describ-
ing the effects of this, which are no longer interdefinable by ¬. Concurrent PDL with
these two modalities is finitely axiomatizable and decidable. Given our interests, we
will only review a fragment of CPDL in the following.
The language of iteration-free, necessity-free CPDL is as follows:
Definition 3.1 Given a set of atomic programs  and atomic propositions , program
expressions γ and formulas φ are defined as:
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γ := g | φ? | γ ; γ | γ ∪ γ | γ × γ
φ := ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | 〈γ 〉φ
where we take p ∈  and g ∈ .
Definition 3.2 A CPDL-model is a structure M = (S, {Rg | g ∈ }, V ) where S is
a set of states, V is a valuation assigning truth values to atomic propositions at states,
and for each g ∈ , Rg ⊆ S × P(S) is a relation of simultaneous reachability. Truth
of a formula φ in M at state s is defined as usual, except for 〈γ 〉φ, which reads:
M, s | 〈γ 〉φ iff there exists T ⊆ S with s Rγ T and T ⊆ φM
Again, the relation Rg , unlike those for programs in PDL, runs from ‘states to sets
of states’. But this time, unlike with our forcing relations for sequential games, the
view of the sets is ‘conjunctive’ rather than ‘disjunctive’: a distributed program runs
from one state to a set of states as its ‘collective output’. This point should be kept
clearly in mind when checking our assertions in what follows.
We now define the intended meanings of the key program constructs in CPDL in
terms of reachability:
Composition: s(R · Q)T iff ∃U ⊆ S with s RU , and a family {Tu : u ∈ U } of subsets
of T with uQTu for all u ∈ U , such that T = ⋃{Tu : u ∈ U }.
Parallel combination: R ⊗ Q = {(s, T ∪ W ) : s RT and s QW }.
Definition 3.3 A CPDL-model is standard if it satisfies
Rα;β = Rα · Rβ
Rα∪β = Rα ∪ Rβ
Rα×β = Rα ⊗ Rβ
Rφ? = {(s, {s}) : M, s | φ}
For this formalism, and even for the full language of CPDL, the following result
has been proved Goldblatt (1992):
Theorem 3.4 CPDL is completely axiomatizable with respect to standard CPDL-
models, and it is decidable.
There are also interesting model-theoretic aspects to CPDL. For example,
van Benthem et al. (1994) give a bisimulation analysis, and show how both sequen-
tial and parallel operations are ‘safe for bisimulation’. Later on, we will state similar
results for our game operations.
Now our task is to combine the model for concurrency presented here with that for
the earlier sequential game logic.
3.2 Forcing relations for product games
To introduce forcing relations for players in product games, we must reconcile the
two earlier perspectives. Games can produce complex outcome states now, denoted
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by sets read ‘conjunctively’ as in CPDL, but players also have choices leading to sets
of such sets, still read disjunctively at this second level as we did with DGL. Here is
our proposal—and it is the essential new feature of this paper. X, U, T, W range over
sets of sets of states, t, w range over sets of states, and s, u range over states:
Definition 3.5 Forcing relations for composite games are these:
sρEG∪G ′ X iff sρ
E
G X or sρ
E
G ′ X
sρ AG∪G ′ X iff sρ
A
G X and sρ
A
G ′ X
sρEGd X iff sρ
A
G X
sρ AGd X iff sρ
E
G X
sρiG;G ′ X iff ∃U : sρiGU and for each u ∈
⋃
U , uρiG ′ X
sρiG×G ′ X iff ∃T , ∃W : sρiG T and sρiG ′ W
and X = {t ∪ w : t ∈ T and w ∈ W }
As an illustration, we show in the following how this format for computation of
players’ powers fits an intuitive example of parallel games, for instance, simultaneous















To make things comparable, we now change earlier single outcomes s to singleton
states s. The powers of E in the game G are given by {{1}},{{2}} and that of A
by {{1}, {2}}. Similarly, in the game H, the powers of E and A are {{3}, {4}} and
{{3}},{{4}}, respectively. The powers of E and A in the product game G × H are
then formed by taking unions: {{1, 3}, {1, 4}},{{2, 3}, {2, 4}} and {{1, 3}, {2, 3}},
{{1, 4}, {2, 4}}, respectively. Reading the inner brackets as conjunctive, and the outer
ones as disjunctive, this seems to fit our intuitions.
3.3 Concurrent DGL
3.3.1 Modal language and forcing models
The language of our new game logic of Concurrent DGL is a simple combination of
all ingredients we had so far:
Definition 3.6 Given a set of atomic games  and atomic propositions , game terms
γ and formulas φ are defined inductively as:
γ := g | φ? | γ ; γ | γ ∪ γ | γ × γ
φ := ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | 〈γ, i〉φ
where we take p ∈ , g ∈  and i ∈ {A, E}.
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The intended meaning of the new game construct α × β is that the games α and β are
played in parallel, without communication.
Definition 3.7 A conjunctive game model is a structure M = (S, {ρig | g ∈ }, V ),
where S is a set of states, V is a valuation assigning truth values to atomic propositions
in states, and with basic relations ρig ⊆ S ×P(P(S)) assigned to basic game expres-
sions g, satisfying the conditions of Monotonicity, Consistency and Non-Triviality.
Here, we assume the same structural conditions on forcing relations as before. In
the semantics of our language, we define the truth of a formula φ in M at a state s in
the obvious manner, with the following key clause for parallel game product:
− M, s | 〈α, i〉φ iff ∃X : sρiα X and ∀x ∈
⋃
X : M, x | φ.
Note that this squashes together the outcomes of all separate games, making only
local assertions at single states. An alternative option would be to evaluate formulas at
‘collective states’, being sets of the original states. We will return to this in Sect. 4.2.
Validities of this logic include all those we had before for DGL•. But the logic now
also encodes facts about parallel games. Here are two, pointing toward an algebra of
parallel games lying encoded here:
− 〈α × β, i〉φ ↔ 〈β × α, i〉φ
− 〈(α × β)d , i〉φ ↔ 〈αd × βd , i〉φ
A crucial further principle will be found just below.
3.3.2 Axioms and completeness
Here is the reduction axiom for game product (‘Product Axiom’):
− 〈α × β, i〉φ ↔ 〈α, i〉φ ∧ 〈β, i〉φ.
Theorem 3.8 The Product Axiom is valid in CDGL.
Proof M, s | 〈α × β, i〉φ
iff ∃X : sρiα×β X and ∀x ∈
⋃
X : M, x | φ
iff ∃X : ∃T, ∃W : sρiαT and sρiβ W and X = {t ∪ w : t ∈ T and w ∈ W } and
∀x ∈ ⋃ X : M, x | φ
iff (by some simple calculation; crucially using Non-Triviality forbidding the forcing
of an empty set of outcome states) ∃T : sρiαT and ∀y ∈
⋃
T : M, y | φ and
∃W : sρiβ W and ∀z ∈
⋃
W : M, z | φ
iff M, s | 〈α, i〉φ and M, s | 〈β, i〉φ
iff M, s | 〈α, i〉φ ∧ 〈β, i〉φ. unionsq
Next, using our earlier methods again, we claim that CDGL is complete.
The argument is a combination of the following two facts.
Fact 3.9 Thanks to the reduction axioms, all game formulas can be reduced to
equivalent ones involving only atomic modalities 〈g, i〉φ.
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Also, our generalized semantics still has the original board models for DGL• as a
special case. For, the map f : S → P(S) with f (s) = {s} is easily lifted to an injective
map from P(S) to P(P(S)), and so, any X ⊆ S can be represented as f (X) ⊆ P(S).
Fact 3.10 There is a faithful embedding from DGL• models into C DGL models
making any DGL•-satisfiable formula C DGL-satisfiable.
Soundness of our axioms on CDGL models is easy to check. Next, suppose φ is not
derivable in CDGL. By Fact 3.9, its atomic equivalent φ′ is not derivable in DGL•.
So, φ′ has a counter-model in DGL•. Then, by Fact 3.10 we get a counter-model in
CDGL. This proves
Theorem 3.11 CDGL is completely axiomatized by the reduction axioms in DGL•
plus the new reduction axiom for product.
Again, decidability can be shown as before, by a simple adjustment.
While this result may seem a victory for PDL-style ‘reductionism’, our product
axiom also reflect the expressive poverty of CDGL (and indeed, also the program
logic CPDL) as an account of parallelism. We have no means of stating truly collec-
tive properties of conjunctive states. We return to this point in Sect. 4.
3.4 Monotonicity: an excursion
Our forcing relations in parallel games still satisfy the original monotonicity and
consistency conditions, as may be proved by induction:
(C1′) Monotonicity: If sρiG X and X ⊆ X ′, then sρiG X ′.
(C2′) Consistency: If sρEG Y and sρ AG Z , then Y and Z overlap.
But really, in CDGL, two set-theoretic levels are relevant to players’ powers: the
‘conjunctive’ output sets inside, and the ‘disjunctive’ sets of these at the outside.
Accordingly, there is ‘outer monotonicity’ adding new sets, and ‘inner monotonicity’
enlarging sets inside a power. The latter has no general appeal for us, since it would
represent stronger outcomes of a process or game. If anything, our weak language
stating universal properties of individual states inside conjunctive sets might suggest
‘downward monotonicity’ at the inside level.
4 Game models and game algebra
4.1 Game models
One of the more basic questions of model theory is: “When are two models equiv-
alent?” The notion of modal bisimulation can be adapted to express equivalences
between game models: detailed discussion can be found in van Benthem et al. (1994)
regarding CPDL, and van Benthem (2002) for general games. For CDGL, the relevant
concept can be formulated as follows.
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Definition 4.1 Let M = (S, {ρig | g ∈ }, V ) and M′ = (S′, {ρ ′ig | g ∈ }, V ′)
be two conjunctive game models. A relation ↔ ⊆ S × S′ is a CDGL-bisimulation
between M and M′, if for any s ↔ s′, we have
1. s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p), for all p ∈ (the atomic proposi tions),
2. For all X ⊆ P(S), and g ∈ (the atomic games), if sρig X , then ∃X ′ ⊆ P(S′)
with s′ρg X ′ and ∀x ′ ∈ ∪X ′, ∃x ∈ ∪X : x ↔ x ′.
3. For all X ′ ⊆ P(S′), and g ∈ , if s′ρ ′ig X ′, then ∃X ⊆ P(S), such that sρig X , and
∀x ∈ ∪X, ∃x ′ ∈ ∪X ′ : x ↔ x ′.
Analogously to the results in Pauly (2001) for DGL, the following theorem shows
that CDGL formulas are invariant for bisimulation, and the CDGL game constructions
are safe for bisimulation:
Theorem 4.2 Let M = (S, {ρig | g ∈ }, V ) and M′ = (S′, {ρ ′ig | g ∈ }, V ′) be
two conjunctive game models, while s  s′ with s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′. Then
1. For all formulae φ: M, s | φ iff M′, s′ | φ.
2. For all games γ : if sρiγ X, then ∃X ′ ⊆ P(S′) with s′ρ ′iγ X ′, and ∀x ′ ∈ ∪X ′, ∃x ∈
∪X : x  x ′.
3. For all games γ : if s′ρ ′iγ X ′, then ∃X ⊆ P(S) with sρiγ X, and ∀x ∈ ∪X, ∃x ′ ∈
∪X ′ : x  x ′.
The proof is a simultaneous induction on the complexity of formulas and games.
The only interesting case is checking the safety of the ‘product’ construction, where
once more, we need the structural property of Non-Triviality.
Our notion of bisimulation is very ‘rough’, squashing the structure of sets of sets
in the forcing relations. This again reflects the poverty of our modal language. Let us
now try to remedy this.
4.2 Intermezzo: a richer ‘collective’ modal language
Can we create a richer modal language, a finer notion of bisimulation for parallel
games and truly collective action? While details of this are beyond the aims of this
paper, we state one possible track, which also throws some light on our actual system.
Let us reinterpret our modal language over sets of states as the basic entities,
including the original states as singletons. This requires a valuation assigning sets
of sets to proposition letters, but otherwise, we can use the same models as before:
Definition 4.3 A collective model is a structure M = (S, {ρig | g ∈ }, V ), with S a
set of states, V a valuation assigning truth values to atomic propositions in sets of states,
with the basic relations ρig ⊆ P(S) × P(P(S)) assigned to basic game expressions g
as before, satisfying again Consistency, Monotonicity, and Non-Triviality.
The sets in P(S) are collective states, and the language can now express proper-
ties of these, rather than just individual states. In particular, while some properties of
collectives may be reducible to those of their constituent points (or, atomic singleton
states), others need not. This ‘set lift’ by itself would also make sense for CPDL,
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to make it a more realistic account of collective action, and we think it might even
simplify the semantics of sequential program composition. The set lift also fits with
the semantics of collective predicates in natural language.
We can now interpret our modal language in collective models M over sets of
states X as the basic indices. The truth definition for formulas φ is standard with the
modality 〈γ, i〉φ lifted as follows:
– M, X | 〈γ, i〉φ iff ∃Y : Xρiγ Y and for all Z ∈ Y,M, Z | φ.
This pretty much recreates CDGL as a logic for sets. But the interesting feature is
now that we can also access other structure, in particular the inclusion structure among
base sets. For this purpose, borrowing an idea from temporal logic, one can introduce
modal operators [⊆]φ for downward inclusion which say that
– M, X | [⊆]φ iff φ holds at each subset of the current set X .
‘Distributive properties’ like the ones in CDGL hold if and only if each atomic
subset has them. These imply their downward modalized versions, but other proper-
ties may, too. Other well-known modal operators that make sense here are an upward
inclusion modality, as well as a binary sum modality 〈+〉φψ saying that the current set
is a union of one satisfying and one satisfying ψ . This seems close to what we want
to say about the output of parallel games as defined above.
We can translate our earlier logics into this extended formalism by forcing every
proposition letter p to become distributive. This can be done using a suitable modal
prefix like [⊆]〈⊆〉p, which says that every subset includes a subset where p holds.
It would be of interest to axiomatize richer modal languages of joint action like
this, and develop the bisimulation-based model theory of parallel play together with
the collective state structure which it produces. We do not expect obvious reduction
principles like the conjunction axiom of CDGL, since the properties of unions of con-
junctive states from the separate games may have only a tenuous relationship to those
of their components.
4.3 Game algebra for DGL• (DGL) and CDGL
Now we take another mathematical perspective, following van Benthem (2003). The
forcing relations in models for logic DGL• (DGL) validate a basic game algebra. Con-
sider a language of game expressions with variables and the operations ∨ (choice for
E), - (dual) and ◦ (sequential composition). We call two game expressions G and H
identical if they give the same forcing relations for both players in each board model.
The valid game identities form a ‘De Morgan Algebra’: a Boolean Algebra without
special laws for 0 and 1. On top of that, further principles describe interactions between
the choice operators and sequential composition. We give a few typical examples of
the valid identities, where the ‘∧’ game is the dual of ‘∨’, with the first choice now
for player A, not E :
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(x ◦ y) ◦ z ≈ x ◦ (y ◦ z)
(x ∨ y) ◦ z ≈ (x ◦ z) ∨ (y ◦ z)
(x ∧ y) ◦ z ≈ (x ◦ z) ∧ (y ◦ z)
−x ◦ −y ≈ −(x ◦ y)
y  z → x ◦ y  x ◦ z
Here s  abbreviates s ∨ t ≈ t . Typically, right-distribution of composition over
choice is invalid here:
G; (H ∪ K ) = (G; H) ∪ (G; K )
On the left, E has a choice for playing game H or K after playing game G; but on the
right, she must decide in advance which of the composed games she has to play. A set
of game equations was conjectured by van Benthem (1999) and was proved complete
by Goranko (2003), Venema (2003).
In a similar manner, our new logic CDGL contains a game algebra, this time also
for a parallel operation ×. It is still unknown what this algebra looks like—though we
have assembled some valid principles:
x × y ≈ y × x
(x × y) × z ≈ x × (y × z)
x × (y ∨ z) ≈ (x × y) ∨ (x × z)
x × (y ∧ z) ≈ (x × y) ∧ (x × z)
−(x × y) ≈ −x × −y
As a matter of fact, one could have different interpretations of × and consequently
different sets of algebraic equations. For example, for some other notions of concurrent
game Idempotence x × x ≈ x might be considered a desideratum.
This setting suggests a representation result for CDGL game algebra in terms of
a concrete algebra of consistent pairs of monotone relations over some game board.
This was done in Venema (2003) for DGL• (DGL) game algebra, but now, we need
to incorporate a product operator—which might give the algebra a ‘quantale’-like
structure. We leave this for future investigations.
5 Connections with logical evaluation games
DGL is a logic of general game structure, but even so, it has strong analogies with
specific games used by logicians for evaluation of first-order formulas φ in models
M. We quickly recall some basics. Verifier V and Falsifier F dispute the truth of a
formula φ in some model M. The game starts from a given assignment s sending
variables to objects in the domain of M. Verifier claims the formula is true in M,
Falsifier claims it is false. The rules of the game eval(φ,M, s) are as follows:
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• If φ is an atom, V wins if φ is true, and F wins if it is false.
• For formulas φ ∨ ψ , V chooses a disjunct to continue with.
• For formulas φ ∧ ψ , F chooses a conjunct to continue with.
• With negation ¬φ, the two players switch roles.
• For existential quantifiers ∃xψ , V chooses some object d in M, and play continues
with φ and s[x := d].
• For universal quantifiers ∀xψ , F chooses some object d in M, and play continues
with φ and s[x := d].
This analogy has been highlighted more formally in van Benthem (2003), who
shows that evaluation games for first-order logic involve a combination of extensive
game trees eval(φ,M, s) where s is a variable assignment at which the game starts,
together with a game board consisting of all variable assignments over the model M.
Players’ powers make sense as well in such situations. E.g., ‘Hintikka’s Lemma’ says
that Verifier has a winning strategy iff φ is true in (M, s), while it is false iff Falsifier
has a winning strategy.
Many central features of DGL that were explained earlier occur in the proof for this
simple lemma, and this is no coincidence. The Booleans of propositional logic match
the game constructs of choice and dual, and quantification involves sequential game
composition, in the way a quantifier ∃x first shifts the current value of the variable
x , ‘and then’ moves on to evaluate the matrix formula. Notice that this set-up has the
same generic character as Parikh’s logic: a formula can start an evaluation game at any
model and assignment, and moreover, the available concrete moves are not encoded
in the formula: what objects can be assigned depends on the model M.
Viewed in this way, first-order evaluation games are a special case of DGL, with
atomic games of two sorts: (a) tests for truth and falsity of atomic formulas, and
(b) variable-to-value reassignment for quantifiers by themselves. On top of these, one
then has the same sequential game constructs as in DGL. This is a non-standard view
of first-order logic, as consisting of a decidable game algebra over specific atomic
games, where the undecidability of the logic comes from the mathematical structure
of the actions (in particular, full assignment spaces), rather than the compositional rep-
ertoire by itself. Still, van Benthem (2003) proves that no generality is lost, through a
converse representation:
Theorem 5.1 There is an effective translation τ from DGL-formulas φ to first-order
formulas, and from DGL game expressions to first-order formula operators, and there
is also a transformation taking any game board M for DGL to a first-order model
M∗ such that
(a) M, s | φ iff M∗, s | τ(φ).
(b) sρi,MG X iff sρi,Mτ(G)X.
The idea is, as in Sect. 2.4, to replace abstract atomic games g by evaluation games
for quantifier combinations ∃∀. Though the cited paper high-lights the ‘game algebra’
of DGL (Sect. 4.3), this representation also implies (van Benthem (2003), Sect. 3.3):
Corollary 5.2 There is a faithful embedding of DGL into the complete game logic of
first-order evaluation games.
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Thus, logic games—of which there are many more than just evaluation games,
though very specialized scenarios, are complete for general game logics of sequential
constructions in a precise sense.
Caveat. These results do not say that general games as in (C)DGL should be
understood as test games ? for propositions  in our earlier sense! The quantifiers are
understood here as real moves changing the current state, and as such, they represent
arbitrary game moves, or at least, arbitrary changes through forced sets.
The above translation involves converting atomic game modalities 〈g〉φ into a rela-
tional modality plus one for ‘set membership’, following the representation result for
powers of players in perfect information games proved in van Benthem (2001). This
is also related to our extended languages in Sect. 4.2, where the inclusion modalities
access substructure of sets as collective states.
Next, as we observed in our introduction, parallel games occur in the extension of
first-order logic to ‘independence-friendly’ IF logic proposed by Hintikka and Sandu
(1997) as a procedural analogue of Henkin’s ‘branching quantifiers’. Indeed, van
Benthem (2003) considered this option, and observed how various basic principles of
IF logic seem to be basic game laws for parallel games. Here is a typical example.







Clearly, this can be described as a game construction of the form:
(G × H); K
with G, H the two quantifier prefix games, and K the subsequent test game. To make
this fit our formal framework, we think of G, H as producing separate assignments
(one, s, to x , y, the other, t , to z, u), and the result of G × H can then be viewed as
the set {s, t}, just as in the semantics of CPDL.
In general, collective states will now be sets of partial assignments, whose merge is
a new total output state. This introduces a new feature not encountered before. Some-
times, these assignments are ‘inconsistent’, their union assigns different values to the
same variable. Thus, we need a CPDL-style semantics where some output sets are
consistent, and others are not. But this is easily accommodated. What seems harder
to accommodate is the role of atomic predicate Rxy whose variables may refer to
different partial assignments. These express truly collective properties of states, more
in line with the extended modal framework of Sect. 4.2. We leave this issue open here.
Another nice example of an algebraic way of thinking is the following basic IF
law. Consider the IF formula ∀x∃y/x Rxy, where the slash indicates that Verifier has
no access to the value chosen by Falsifier for x . There has been some discussion
about equivalents for this, with some people claiming that it is just ∃y∀x Rxy. But
van Benthem (2006) shows that the correct transform is the formula ∃y∀x/y Rxy,
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which gives players the same powers under any concrete interpretation. This inver-
sion of quantifiers seems to go against the received wisdom in first-order logic. But
when viewed in terms of our game algebra, it demystifies simply to the earlier com-














Thus, we are really seeking, once more, to fill a corner in a diagram:
DGL F O L
C DGL  Branching quanti f ier game logic
In this connection, van Benthem (2003) has proposed to define powers of players
in parallel games through the following stipulation:
sρiG×H X iff ∃U : sρiGU, ∃V : sρiH V : U × V ⊆ X.
But we have found it hard to make sense of this, and our system CDGL is our new
attempt at supplying the ‘missing corner’.
Clearly, all valid laws of CDGL can be instantiated as valid principles of branching
quantification, or general IF logic. Thus, we have found a decidable core logic inside
a rather gruesome higher-order system, whose combinatorial nature is still somewhat
ill-understood. Even so, open problems abound. For instance,
Question. Can we extend Theorem 5.1 to a representation of CDGL models in
terms of IF evaluation games of imperfect information?
We could try to use the representation theorem for powers in imperfect informa-
tion games of van Benthem (2001) for this purpose, introducing suitable moves and
uniform strategies over given game boards. Another possible result might arise by
sticking to a modal language, but using an IF-variant for it, as in Sevenster (2006).
Finally, given our discussion, we do not see our proposal as a complete analysis of IF
logic. But this distance is also a virtue. Compare what Blass (1972) did for Lorenzen’s
‘dialogue games’, famous for their blend of attractive insights and obnoxious details.
Inside dense thickets of ‘procedural conventions’, he saw a compositional game struc-
ture, which was the dawn of linear logic. Indeed, Abramsky (2006) has taken a similar
look at IF logic, and proposed a linear logic-based analysis. While our analysis is more
crude than his, it is in the same spirit.
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6 Conclusions and intentions
This paper merges dynamic logic of games with modal logics of concurrency.
The resulting system CDGL has a semantics on generalized game boards allowing for
parallel play and compositional analysis of players’ powers for determining outcomes.
Our main new result says that the set of validities is axiomatizable, and decidable by
reduction to a poly-modal base logic over generalized neighborhood models. CDGL
also suggests new algebraic and model-theoretic questions, such as axiomatizing its
complete game algebra (or CPDL itself), or exploring its model theory based on our
new notion of bisimulations. Finally, we showed that CDGL may throw some new light
on IF evaluation games for first-order logic which allow for interpreting independence
or imperfect information.
The framework proposed here is a bare minimum, and its reduction of powers
to component games, while convenient, makes it a poor theory of parallel play. We
have indicated a richer modal language of parallel games in Sect. 4.2, which would
allow for genuine collective predicates. In addition, we list some further avenues of
investigation in the following.
Modal fixed-point logics. Our system of game logic left out the infinitary game
iteration of the original DGL, since our main concern was orthogonal: a lift to parallel
games. Nevertheless, various infinitary game iterations make sense in game theory
and process semantics of linear logic. In particular, van Eijck and Verbrugge (2008)
have extended essentially our system to include Parikh’s PDL-style Kleene iteration.
All this raises the issue of how DGLs relate to modal fixed-point logics generally. As is
well-known, modal logic over neighbourhood models can be translated into bimodal
logics over standard relational models, and Parikh (1985) uses this to embed DGL into
the modal mu-calculus, while the same ‘〈〉[]-trick’ drives the representation theorem
in van Benthem (2003). Still, neighbourhood semantics has tricky features like this:
fixed-point equations for common knowledge are no longer equivalent to PDL-style
countable iterations: cf. van Benthem and Sarenac (2004). Thus, a translation of PDL
over neighbourhood models must end up, not in bimodal PDL but the mu-calculus.
So, what is the natural fixed-point structure of operations on games, when interpreted
over modal-style game boards?
Extensive games and communication. Parallel processes and games are studied
at the richer level of extensive game trees in Process Algebra and Game Seman-
tics. Connections with our modal analysis over game boards remain to be developed.
In particular, linear game semantics has a richer repertoire of game operations with
communication, including powers of switching between games, and strategic manoeu-
vres like ‘Copy cat’: for details, see Abramsky and Jagadeesan (1994). This reflects the
interleaving nature of its products, whereas our direct products allow no interaction
between subgames at all.
Logics of strategies. DGL and its ilk state the existence of strategies, but do not
display any strategies in their formalism. By contrast, game semantics, and indeed
game theory itself has many interesting strategic manoeuvres between stages of one
sequential game, or components of parallel games, such as ‘strategy stealing’. van
Benthem (2002) has used dynamic logic to explicitly define strategies of players in
extensive games. In subsequent work, we intend to combine the two perspectives,
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and do a ‘double gamification’—so to speak—for PDL, once as a logic of game
structure, and once as a logic of strategies within these games. See Netchitailov (2000),
van Benthem (2007) and Ghosh (2008) for some first steps.
Explicit knowledge. Intuitively, parallel games involve knowledge and communi-
cation between players. Indeed, IF logic involves games of imperfect information,
where players need not know each others’ moves, while one of our key examples of
non-determinacy was a game of the same sort. van Benthem (2006) has an explicit
epistemic language bringing this out. It is not hard to add knowledge modalities to
DGL and CDGL, to state explicitly what players know about their powers—and doing
this would be more appropriate for some of our motivating examples. But getting to
a complete game logic in this setting is not routine. Game operations may ‘package’
some epistemic information (our product said implicitly that no communication take
place). But in general, explicit epistemic structure seems at odds with the composi-
tionality that we have used throughout, in line with the observation in game theory
that imperfect information games have no good notion of subgame, and hence no easy
game algebra. The experience with compositionality in IF logic may be relevant there:
see discussions in Hodges (1997).
Goals and preferences. Real game theory is, as we noted in our Introduction, about
players pursuing goals driven by their evaluation of outcomes, or their preferences
between them. Does our abstract modal approach still make sense in this setting,
where raw powers might have to give way to more interactive notions of equilibrium?
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